2-21-03

(4)

STATE OF FLORIDA BOARD OF MEDICINE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DEPUTY CLERK
CLERK VICHIR, Kenon

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,

Petitioner,

vs.

rn

DOH Case No.: 1999-61662 DOAH Case No.: 2002-50601

License No.: ME0062034

ANTHONY GLENN ROGERS, M.D.,

Respondent.

mmp-CWS

## ORDER

pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, on April 4, 2003, in West Palm Beach, Florida, for the purpose of considering the Administrative Law Judge's Recommended Order and Petitioner's Exceptions to Recommended Order (copies of which are attached hereto as Exhibits A and B, respectively) in the above-styled cause. Petitioner was represented by Ephraim Livingston, Senior Attorney. Respondent was not present and but was represented by C. William Berger, Esquire.

Upon review of the Recommended Order, the argument of the parties, and after a review of the complete record in this case, the Board made the following determination:

The Board accepted the Petitioner's exceptions to paragraphs 41 and 42 of the recommended order. Within paragraph 41 and 42 of the recommended order, the Administrative Law Judge adopted an interpretation of Section 458.331(1)(q), Florida Statutes, which

employed "an abuse of professional discretion standard," rather than simple negligence, in order to establish guilt under Section 458.331(1)(q), Florida Statutes. Specifically, the Administrative Law Judge ruled that when the state charges a physician with violating Section 458.331(1)(q), it must show the following:

[T]he Department must prove that the accused doctor was not practicing medicine when he prescribed the drugs in question but instead was engaged in an illicit (probably oftentimes criminal) activity, e.g. selling narcotics to a "patient" who was not really sick but wanted the drugs for recreational purposes.

The Administrative Law Judge's above-quoted holding is not supported by law.

The Board is of the opinion that when prosecuting a physician for violating Section 458.331(1)(q), the Department is not obligated to prove that the physician "was not practicing medicine when he prescribed the drugs" nor is it required to employ "an abuse of professional discretion standard." A more reasonable interpretation of Section 458.331(1)(q) contemplates an ordinary negligence standard, and accordingly, calls for the Department to show that the physician prescribed legend drugs or controlled substances "inappropriately or in excessive or inappropriate quantities" to a patient. Such would be considered "other than in the course of the physician's professional practice." See, Scheininger v. Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners, 443 So.2d 387 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (The First District Court of Appeal upheld the

suspension of a physician for violating Sections 458.331(1)(t) and (q), Florida Statutes, when it was found that the physician dispensed controlled substances to patients under his continuing care without first giving them physical examinations as required by the minimum acceptable prevailing community medical standards.)

Since the Administrative Law Judge's findings as to whether the Respondent violated Section 458.331(1)(q) were based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, this matter is hereby REMANDED to the Division of Administrative Hearings for findings based on the negligence standard as stated above. Cohn v.

Department of Professional Regulation, 477 So.2d 1039, 1047 (Fla. 3<sup>rd</sup> DCA 1985)

DONE AND ORDERED this 2/ day of HARL.

BOARD OF MEDICINE

Larry McPherson, Jr., Executive Director for Raghavendra Vijayanagar, M.D., Chair

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Swan K. Stant